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SUMMARIES AND COMMENTS 675 
MURPHY, James Bernard. The Philosophy of Positive Law: Foundations of 
Jurisprudence. New Haven and London: Yale University Press. 2005. 
xiii + 240 pp. Cloth, $40.00?This meticulously researched book ad 
dresses a central question of analytical and philosophical jurisprudence: 
What is positive law? Throughout his analysis, James Bernard Murphy, 
author of The Moral Economy of Labor: Aristotelian Themes in Eco 
nomic Theory (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), contrasts posi 
tive law with the other two kinds of law that constitute the triad of legal 
concepts?natural law and customary law. Although they are treated at 
length in this work, Murphy states in the preface that he intends to write 
a companion volume on natural law and customary law, "thus complet 
ing the foundation of philosophical jurisprudence" (p. x). It is an ambi 
tious project, but Murphy is up to the task. Murphy displays a vast 
knowledge of analytical jurisprudence, of the history, sociology, and an 
thropology of law, as well as of linguistics (study of language is the fun 
damental analytical tool employed by Murphy). The Philosophy of Pos 
itive Law is a searching examination of the concept of positive law? 
apparently the first such book length study?in the works of four semi 
nal legal philosophers, Plato, St. Thomas Aquinas, Thomas Hobbes, and 
John Austin (along with "eminent" and contemporary scholars thereof), 
allowing Murphy to draw magisterial conclusions about the jurispru 
dence of positive law. 
In the introduction, Murphy accepts the definition of positive law as 
"the law that human courts enforce" (p. 2). Positive law is thus distin 
guished from "legal positivism," which is succinctly defined as the claim 
that "law can be identified and distinguished from other norms by a set 
of empirical criteria and that the content of law has no necessary con 
nection to moral truth" (p. 22). Yet the perennial question remains: 
"What distinguishes law enforced by courts from all the other kinds of 
law, which are not so enforced?" (p. 1). Chapter 1 seeks the roots of an 
answer in a philosophical debate over language among the ancient 
Greeks. In Plato's Cratylus, Socrates asserts against Cratylus that a 
law-giver names things as natural images of what they are; and against 
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Hermogenes, Socrates asserts that names do not thereby emerge by na 
ture but from social agreement. In this debate over social convention 
and natural necessity, we can trace the origins of the philosophical defi 
nition of positive law, as law that "finds its source in some authoritative 
enactment (in contrast to custom) or that . . . lacks intrinsic force (in 
contrast to natural law)" (p. 18). 
Through this prism, St. Thomas Aquinas is significantly identified in 
Chapter 2 as the "first major theorist of positive law" (p. 55) because of 
his paradigm of law as an authoritative imposition by a legislator. 
Aquinas recognizes both divine positive law and human positive law, 
which derive binding force from a complex interplay of morally neces 
sary content and the sovereignty of the promulgator. As to divine law, 
Aquinas distinguishes the parts of the Mosaic law which possess generic 
moral force and hence are immutable, with those that have merely legal 
force and are applicable only to Israel. Likewise, enacted human laws 
acquire moral force from both a rational connection to a principle of 
morality and from the rational requirement to obey the law-giver. In 
Chapter 3, Murphy finds that Hobbes's account of positive law, although 
linguistically rich, is not able to achieve a clear distinction between law 
which is positive because it is imposed and law which is positive be 
cause determinate and not vague or uncertain in content. Many of the 
same ambiguities pervade John Austin's jurisprudence of positive law. 
In chapter four, Austin is shown to have been greatly concerned with 
questions of moral truth and divine law, in the pattern of Aquinas and 
Hobbes, rather than the utilitarian jurisprudence of the Benthamites to 
which he is usually linked. In his conclusion, Murphy suggests that 
much of the confusion over the discourse of legal positivity stems from 
a misplaced emphasis on statutory law as the supreme, and perhaps the 
only, form of positive law. The insights of contemporary legal anthro 
pologists, historians, sociologists, and philosophers indicate that norm 
applying institutions?courts?are a more important source of positive 
law than legislatures. This conclusion would seem to indicate that the 
search of analytical philosophers such as Hans Kelsen and H. L. A. Hart 
for a single enacted norm that underlies a legal system is misplaced. 
The Philosophy of Positive Law reviews with great erudition the con 
tribution of leading legal thinkers to concepts of positive law, while clar 
ifying the pervasive confusion over the descriptive claim that law is pos 
itive because it has been duly enacted and the normative claim that law 
is positive because it lacks intrinsic connection to moral principles. 
This analysis allows for a persuasive and even striking rethinking of his 
torical jurisprudence: for example, recognizing Aquinas not only for his 
natural law philosophy but for presenting "a full-blown ideology of legal 
positivism" (p. 57) and Hobbes and Austin for their overlooked efforts to 
connect divine and moral law with positive law.?Howard Bromberg, 
Ave Maria School of Law. 
